Antifrustrationism

Antifrustrationism is an axiological position proposed by German philosopher Christoph Fehige,^[1] which states that "we don't do any good by creating satisfied extra preferences. What matters about preferences is not that they have a satisfied existence, but that they don't have a frustrated existence."^[2] According to Fehige, "maximizers of preference satisfaction should instead call themselves minimizers of preference frustration."^[2]

^ Support for that Fehige presents antifrustrationism as an axiological (value theory) position rather than a claim in normative ethics include Fehige 1998, p. 508: "How good or bad is a world? Let us assume, as so often, that this is a matter solely of the preferences it contains and of their frustration and satisfaction. One question we shall then have to face is how the existence of a preference and its satisfaction compares to the non-existence of this preference: is it better, or worse, or just as good, or sometimes one and sometimes the other? Section 1 will argue at length that, ceteris partibus, the two options – satisfied preference and no preference – are equally good, a doctrine we can call antifrustrationism."
^ ^a ^b Fehige 1998, p. 518.

[1] Support for that Fehige presents antifrustrationism as an axiological (value theory) position rather than a claim in normative ethics include Fehige 1998, p. 508: "How good or bad is a world? Let us assume, as so often, that this is a matter solely of the preferences it contains and of their frustration and satisfaction. One question we shall then have to face is how the existence of a preference and its satisfaction compares to the non-existence of this preference: is it better, or worse, or just as good, or sometimes one and sometimes the other? Section 1 will argue at length that, ceteris partibus, the two options – satisfied preference and no preference – are equally good, a doctrine we can call antifrustrationism."

[FOOTNOTEFehige1998518-2] Fehige 1998, p. 518.

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